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BAR BRIEFS
husband and upon any and all moneys which he may hereafter attain
and acquire as such provision is not a definite liability or a judgment for
a specific amount so that it may become a lien upon the husband's
property." The court also maintained that equity courts in North Dakota
have no inherent power to decree alimony in a divorce proceeding unless
specifically authorized by the statute. Leifert v. Wolfer, N. D., 24 N. W.
(2d.) 690 (1945).
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §35-0104 provides that: "a judgment which,
in whole or in part, directs the payment of money," may be docketed and
that: "judgment shall be a lien on all the real property, except the homestead, of every person against whom any such judgment is rendered,
which he may have in any county in which such judgment is docketed at
the time of docketing or which he thereafter shall acquire in such county,
for ten years from the time of docketing the same in the county in which
it was rendered." There is also a provision that: "The court may require
either party to give reasonable security for providing maintenance or
making any payments required under the provisions of this chapter, and
may enforce the same by appointment of a receiver or by any other
remedy applicable to the case..." N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §14-0525.
In Gaston v. Gaston, 144 Cal. 542, 46 Pac. 609 (1896), the court said,
referring to a statute similar to North Dakota's, that a statute authorizing
the court, in a divorce proceeding, to require the husband to give reasonable
security for providing maintenance, and giving the court the power to
enforce its order, should not be so construed as to abridge the equitable
power of the court to make the maintenance a lien or charge upon the real
estate of the husband.
"A lien is created by contract of the parties or by operation of law."
N, D. Rev. Code (1943) §35-0104.
An example of a lien created by contract of the parties is found in
Gray v. Gray, 24 N. D. 89, 176 N. W. 7 (1919), where the parties signed
an agreement that the property of the husband should be incumbered by a
lien in favor of the wife to secure the payment of alimony.
A majority of the state courts regard a decree for alimony as a debt
of record in the same manner as any other judgment for money. Glenn,
Creditors Rights, 1915 §71 n. 2, Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash. 48, 62
Pac. 125 (1900), Conrad v. Everick, 50 Ohio St. 476, 35 N. E. 48 (1893).
The judgment itself is a lien upon the real property of the debtor. Hulbert
v. Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430, 111 N. E. 70, L.R.A. 1916 D 661, Ann. Cas. 1917
D 180 (1916).
eir
The case under discussion hinges on the power of the courts and tl,
jurisdiction with regard to divorce decrees.
"Jurisdiction in matters
relating to divorce and alimony is conferred by statute, and the power of
the courts to deal with such matters must find support in the statute or it
does not exist." Sate ex rel. Hagert v. Templeton ect. 18 N. D. 525, 123
N.W. 383, 25 L.A.R. (N.S.) 234 (1909). Justice Burke, dissenting in McLean
v.McLean, 69 N. D. 665. 290 N. W. 913 (1940). said. "there is no question
but that the trial court in a divorce action has the power, when a divorce is
granted, to make an equitable distribution of the property of the parties
(14-0524) and to impress the property of a party to the action with a lien
to enforce phyment of the sums such party was directed to pay the
other (14-0525)."
DEAN WINKJER.
BASTARDY-WHO MAY INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS. A pregnant mother in
consideration of a sum of money released the putative father from all
liability for support and maintenance. The child, two years old, now sues
the putative father for support and education and to have the release
made between mother and defendant set aside. Held, neither common law
nor the statutes of New York or New Jersey authorize a suit by the child
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against the putative father. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction of the court granted. Albanese v. Richter, 67 F. Supp.
771 (1946).
A bastardy action is neither civil nor criminal but partakes of the
nature of both. State v. Lang, 19 N. D. 679, 125 N. W. 558 (1910). While
bastardy is not a crime, failure to support the child is made a crime in
most jurisdictions and is prosecuted by the state.
The general rule is that a child does not have the right to sue in civil
court. In North Dakota the child is not given the right to maintain the
action. The mother, her legal representative, 'or a third person who has
furnished an adjudged bastard necessaries may maintain the action.
N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 32-3603-04. The majority of the states reserve
this right to the mother. Ala. Code (1928) § 3416; Ark. Dig. (1937)
§ 928; Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 6296; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1918) § 6006;
Fla. Stat. (1941) § 742.01; Smith-Hurd Ill. Anno. Stat. Chap. 17 § 1;
Ind. Stat. (1926) § 1049; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 406-020; Page's Ohio
Gen. Code (1926) § 12110. Other states reserve this right of action to
the officials of the town or county wherein the child is living. Ga. Code
(1926), P. C. §§ 1330-36; Iowa Code (1939) § 12667.8; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1929) § 12910; Okla. Stat. (1941) Tit. 10 § 54; Minn. Stat. Anno.
(1947) § 257.18. The action may be brought in the name of a legal
representative of the mother. Ariz. Code (1939) § 27-401; Del. Code (1935)
§ 3559; N. J. Rev. Code (1937) Chap. 9 § 16; N. C. Gen. Stat. (1943)
§ 49-50; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 13-111. Two states indicate that the
action must be brought by the town where the child is living or is about
to become a public charge. R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) Chap. 424 § 1; Tenn.
Code (1932) § 11936.
States which have adopted the uniform act pertaining to bastardy
allow an action by the mother, her representative, third persons furnishing
support to the child, or by authorities charged with the support of the
child. Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming. See 9 U.L.A. Misc. Acts 389. But where the action has been
commenced and the mother dies, at least one state declares the action
is not abated but may be amended and brought in the name of the child
and a guardian appointed. Kan. Gen. Stat. (1935) § 62-2310. But this
cannot be construed to give the original right of acticn to the child, for
that right is reserved only to the unmarried mother of the child. Kan.
Gen. Stat. (1935) § 62-2301. Other states hold the mother must be unmarried, though some jurisdictions hold that a married woman may be
the mother of a bastard child. In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Calif. 82, 183
Pac. 552 (1919) ; State v. Liles, 134 N.C. 735. 47 S.E. 750 (1904) ; State v.
Coliton, 73 N. D. 582, 17 N. W. (2d) 546,156 A.L.R. 1403 (1945).
Statutory law having given a child the right to have an action brought
for him to recover support and maintenance, it is interesting to note the
history and development of this right. Under the oldest known code of
laws, the Code of Hammurabi (2270 B. C.) there was no provision pertaining to the rights of a family, though there were laws governing contracts,
torts, leases, carriers, agency and others. It did contain a law punishing
a child with death if his father had caused the death of another. Evolution
of Law, Kocourek and Wigmore, Vol. 1, p. 387, 409. Under the Hebrew
Code (1000 B. C.) a child was not punished for an act of the father. Each
person was liable for his own acts.
The laws of Gortyn (450 N. C.) provided that if a child born after
divorce was sent to the-father he could accept or reject the child. A rejection
meant that the mother could rear the child or dispose of it by death without
any penalty being inflicted upon her.
The rights of the child did not increase under the R-omans. The Twelve
Tables are silent concerning rights of the child. Under the Roman laws,
however, pater familius could sell his child to slavery, or could control it
completely, even to life or death. In this respect the Roman laws coincided
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with the Code of Hammurabi. Id. p. 410. But gradually the power of the
father began to diminish and children were given some rights. Though
the common law did not recognize the right of a child to support from a
putative fathp.r, In re Zimmer, 64 N. D. 410, 253 N. W. 749 (1934), this
right has been recognized in all, states by statute, and many states regard
all children as legitimate. See Ariz. Code (1939) § 27-401.
It would appear, therefore, that an infant nullius is adequately
protected under statutory law, and that there is no reason why he should
be permitted to bring a suit in his own name against the putative father.
From a legal standpoint, the holding in Albanese v. Richter, supra,
is logical and just. From a moral viewpoint it precludes unfairness.
HUGH McCUTCHEON.

CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-KLEPTOMANIA
AS A
DEFENSE.
Judicial
efforts to keep abreast of other fields of science, particularly medical
science, have presented an interesting problem in jurisprudence in connection with the use of kleptomania as a defense to larceny. The defense has
been interposed based upon the theory that kleptomania is a form of
insanity.

The courts of the United States are divided as to the proper test
which is applicable in general to the defense of insanity. The so called
"right and wrong" test, as enunciated in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark &
Finelly 200 (1843), has found favor in a number of American jurisdictions,
including North Dakota, and is used by them as the sole test of insanity.
State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223 (Gil. 178), 88 Am. Dec. 70 (1865) ; State v.
Throndson, 49 N. D. 348. 191 N. W. 628 (1922). However. in certain other
jurisdictions an additional test known as the "irresistible impulse" is applied.
Smith v. U. S., 36 F. (2d) 548, 59 App. D.C. 144, 70 A.L.R. 654 (1929) ;
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 SO. 854 (1886); 44 C.J.S. 20, sec. 2;
Vish. Crim. Law (8th ed.) sec. 383b; 1 Burdick, Law of Crimes, sec. 213
(1946) ; 1 Whart. Crim. Law (10th ed.) sec. 44.
In State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N. W. 503. 55 L.R.A. 378,
S9 Am. St. Rep. 382 (1901), the accused was charged with larceny and
defended on the ground that he was a kleptomaniac. The trial court gave
instructions to the jury on insanity stating that if the acts were the result
and offspring of insanity, the accused should be acquitted; if of avarice or
greed, the accused should be convicted. This instruction was held to be
erroneous on the ground that kleptomania is an irresistible desire to, steal.
The court, in discussing kleptomania, said: "It is a weakening of the will
power to'.such an extent as to leave the afflicted onp Powerless to control
his impulse to appropriate the personal property of others, without regard
to whether such impulse is inspired by avarice, greed or idle fancy."
In other jurisdictions, where a similar problem has been presented,
the courts have refused to apply the "irresistible impulse" test to kleptomania and continue to apply the "right and wrong" test. Lowe v. State,
44 Tex. Cr. 224, 70 S.W. 206 (1902); State v. Riddle, 245 Mo. 451, 150 S.W.
1044 (1912) ; 22 C.J.S. 129, sec. 61, note 95-96; (1936) 34 Mich. L. Rev.
569. The Texas court held that kleptomania is a defense to larceny only
where it deprives the defendant of his sense of right and wrong; but if he
is able to comprehend that the act is wrong, the mere irresistible impulse
is insufficient. Hence, if it is shown that the defendant did have sufficient
mental capacity at the time the act was committed to distinguish between
right and wrong, kleptomania will not operate as a defense.
While an irresistible impulse must be more than mere absence of
resistance or a theoretical rejection of free will, high medical authority
states that an impulse may be truly irresistible, although the actor is

